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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OPEC
Loring Allen
University of Missouri-St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri

Abstract
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a part
of the hard reality of the present and future energy position of
the U. S. It burst upon the world scene in 1973 in response to
long years of shabby treatment by the oil companies and oil-impor
ting countries. Through cooperation in the exercise of their sov
ereignty over oil deposits, OPEC members have extracted increasing
revenues through restricting production and raising price. Al
though serving its own interests, OPEC benefits also the rest of
the world, even though its presence portends a shift in the world
balance of power.

1.

a new market arrangement, more than sex-

INTRODUCTION

tupled the market price of crude oil, and

When Dr. Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo and

redistributed world income.

Sheikh Abdullah Tariki concocted the
idea of OPEC in the summer of 1960,
neither dreamed that in only 13 years it

And that was

only the beginning.
2.

BEFORE OPEC

would control world crude oil production

2.1

and prices. The Venezuelan and Saudi
Arabian oil ministers were merely seeking

When Exxon President Walter Teagle and

ACHNACARRY AGREEMENT

Sir John Cadman of British Petroleum just

to pressure Exxon, Shell, and other

happened to drop by Sir Henri Deterding's

large companies to maintain the posted
price. The companies had cut that price

country house, Achnacarry Castle, for a
bit of grouse shooting in 1928, they

in 1959 and 1960, shifting revenues

created a cartel.

based on the posted price from the pro

The agreement was an

imperfect yet flexible instrument.

ducing countries to the companies.

Even

though it did not halt gluts and short
ages, it helped to stabilize the market.

These two men, with their counterparts
from Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, began a
movement in September, 1960, that split

And it served the Seven Sisters, as
Enrico Mattel later dubbed them, with

the weakened private cartel, established

great profits and power for nearly three
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decades. Even in 1973 the cartel re
tained effectiveness.

into the chinks and cracks between the
Seven Sisters. Enrico Mattei assaulted

2.2

COMPANY OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

the cartel by wooing exporting countries
with more than 50 percent of profits. The

The oil companies displayed a common
pattern in their overseas operations.

new companies, with an assist from surplus

Shell and others operated in several
countries.

Mexico and other producers

hosted American, British, and Dutch inter
ests. The companies protected themselves
with several sources of supply and con
fronted exporting countries with awesome
power. A company could punish or reward
countries according to their compliance
with its wishes. The 1938 Mexican expro
priation jolted the companies a bit. But
the successful American and European boy
cott and enforced compensation taught the
other countries a lesson:
with the oil companies.
2.3

don't monkey

EXPORTERS’ POLICIES

Restive exporting countries nonetheless
began to flex their muscles.
In 1943
Venezuela introduced the income tax. It
didn't hurt the companies any; indeed, it
benefitted them. They could appear as
great benefactors, but in fact, what the
companies paid Venezuela was money that
they would have paid in U. S. taxes. The
companies even absorbed the 50-50 profit
split of 1948 with only modest protest,
since it cost them nothing. Later they
graciously let it apply to their Saudi
Arabian and other Middle Eastern producers.
But the punishment meted out to Iran when
it nationalized British Petroleum in 1951
demonstrated that the companies could
still stick together and dominate both
the market and exporting countries.
2.4

RISE OF THE INDEPENDENTS

Soviet crude, threatened to undermine the
profits of the big companies in the late
1950s by flooding the market with oil.
2.5

MARKET RESPONSE

Crude went at discounts, product prices
declined, and filling stations enticed
customers with giveaway gimmickry. The
companies tried to maintain the posted
price. But in 1959 as pressure on the
companies mounted, they cut it. Exporting
countries complained bitterly of lost
revenues, since the companies used the
posted price to figure taxes and royalties.
Venezuela responded by changing the profit
split to 67-33. Other countries made
threats. But in August, 1960, Monroe
Rathbone, the new Exxon president, con
vinced his board that competition re
quired a further shift of income from pro
ducing countries to his company. Exxon
cut the price. Others followed suit.
Within a month, OPEC was born.
3.
3.1

DEVELOPMENT OF OPEC

OPEC GOALS

OPEC members wanted the pre-1959 posted
price restored. The companies did not
oblige for a decade and even then only
under the threat of revolutionary rifles.
In the early 1960s, as it became obvious
that the companies would not back down on
prices, OPEC cast about for other means
to increase their incomes. They bargained
to have royalties treated as a cost,
rather than equivalent to taxes, to re

the strength of the cartel. J. Paul
Getty, H. L. Hunt, Armand Hammer, and

duce marketing allowances, and to cut out
discounts. OPEC's economic success was
modest, but sufficient to convince its

other independent oil companies moved

members that cooperation had a payoff.

But upstart enterprises soon began to sap

3.2

LEARNING YEARS

3.5

LIBYAN VICTORY AND AFTERMATH

But the 1960s were critical years, the

The moment was propitious.

learning years, for OPEC.

plying a quarter of Europe's oil needs.

Other than

Libya was sup

Venezuela, almost no OPEC member knew

The Suez Canal was still closed.

anything about the oil industry and

which could bring more Gulf oil to the

hadn't the slightest idea about how to

Mediterranean, met with a bulldozer acci

control it.

dent just as Libya made its move.

They taught one another in

Tapline,

Syria

OPEC and the oil companies, inadvertently
perhaps, proved the best teacher of all.

refused permission to repair it.

Bit by bit, through discussions, negotia

production.

tions, travels, and through debates and

not come to the rescue of Occidental as

The

Biafran rebellion had halted Nigeria's
The other oil companies would

resolutions at the semi-annual OPEC

they had British Petroleum in Iran.

meetings, each country developed a cadre

dental knuckled under.

of professionals who knew the industry,

panies posted a higher price.

at home and abroad, and knew exactly

Gulf countries now readied demands for an

what they wanted.

even larger increase in price.

3.3

3.6 CARACAS MEETING AND TEHERAN AGREEMENT

POLICY STATEMENT

Occi

Soon all the com
The Persian

Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Harvard and

During the OPEC meeting in Caracas in

NYU educated Saudi Arabian oil minister,

December, 1970, the Venezuelan Congress

wrote a document in the spring of 1968

gave President Caldera the power to set

embodying the state of OPEC policy think

the tax-reference price unilaterally.

ing.

The OPEC price and tax strategy coalesced

In June in Vienna the OPEC members

subscribed to this remarkable Declara

at that meeting.

tory Statement of Petroleum Policy.

producing countries, consuming countries,

Its

In the following months

two principal points were cash and con

and oil companies played a high-stakes

trol.

poker game.

The producing countries must con

The companies tried to mar

trol the price and production of crude
oil, displacing the oil companies, and

of their home governments to beat back the

reap the rewards.

OPEC demands.

3.4

and in the showdown in Teheran in February,

shal their combined power as well as that

LIBYA'S INITIATIVE

But dissension developed

1971, OPEC won a higher price for Gulf
The first testing came in an unlikely
place:

Libya.

oil.

Revolutionary hotheads

hike for Mediterannean oil.

first picked on a single company, Occi
dental, owned by Armand Hammer.
choice was not accidental.

Then Libya demanded and got another
Price was

now the business of both the oil companies

The

and OPEC

members.

Occidental

was an independent with no source of

3.7

crude other than Libya.

With cash assured through partial control

Colonel Maumer

PARTICIPATION AND NATIONALIZATION

Qadaffi in 1970 demanded a higher posted

of price, OPEC than turned to control.

price.

Venezuela passed legislation paved the

When the company dallied he or

dered a cutback of one-third in produc

way for the reversion of its oil industry

tion and prepared to move troops into

to the state.

the oil fields to close them down.

Sheikh Yamani, who had been

a nominal Aramco director since 1962, now
demanded real
605

Saudi Arabian participa

tion; part ownership and a voice in

the companies to meet in October, 1973,

management, starting with 20 percent and

to negotiate on prices.

The companies

going to 51 percent in a few years.

offered 25 percent; OPEC demanded 100

Kuwait and other Arab OPEC members
pressed similar demands. Meantime,

percent. The meeting broke down. As he
boarded his plane for a special OPEC

Algeria nationalized 51 percent of French

meeting in Kuwait, Sheikh Yamani advised

holdings and Libya nationalized British
Petroleum.

company spokesmen to stay tuned to their

3.8

from Kuwait that OPEC had unilaterally

radios.

PRICE REVISIONS

Cash was not forgotten.

A few days later they heard

increased the price 70 percent. The fol
lowing day the companies learned of the

The Teheran

five-year agreement was only months old
when OPEC insisted on revising it be
cause of the U. S. devaluation, and

Arab production cutbacks and embargo.
But even without the war OPEC would have
wrested control of the industry from the
companies.

again later for the second devaluation.
And in the participation negotiations
price was central.

4.2

The price the com

panies paid to buy back the government's
oil had to be settled.

EMBARGO, CUTBACKS, AND PRICE

A buyer's competitive scramble pushed the
price up and up. OPEC countries vied

In September,

1973, Sheikh Yamani had his way and got

with one another in proclaiming higher

the participation and buy-back price he

buy-back and posted prices.

wanted.

oil to the United States, Western Europe,

deals.

Other Arab states made similar
OPEC was now getting both cash

and Japan declined.

Mile-long lines

and control.

appeared at filling stations.

3.9

crisis atmosphere prevailed.

GLUT TO SHORTAGE

Supplies of

A frantic
The Arab

cutbacks and embargo in fact caused only
Until 1970 the oil companies worried
about the oil glut. But the conversion

a modest shortage but fear and the psycho
logical impact fortified the price in

of American, West European, and Japanese

crease and OPEC control.

industry from coal to oil, the economic
growth of the industrial countries, and

1974, OPEC pushed the price up again, to
$11.65, compared to $3.01 a barrel before
the October meeting.

their voracious transportation appetites
gobbled up the oil.

In January,

The industrial

countries had increasing deficits and

4.3

the market price inched up, in 1973 even

Since early 1974 OPEC has consolidated
its dominance of world oil. After roy

exceeding the posted price.

Lines in

OPEC PRICES SINCE 1974

front of the pumps replaced filling sta

alty and tax adjustments in 1974 and a

tion giveaways.
mounted.

10 percent increase in 1975, OPEC froze

4.

OPEC bargaining power

the price in October, 1975.

Then in

December, 1976, at Doha, all OPEC members

OPEC CAPTURES THE CRUDE PRICE

except Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
4.1

OPEC SETS THE PRICE

Emirates increased the price 10 percent,
with 5 percent more scheduled for 1977.

The event that delivered the world petro
leum industry into OPEC hands was the
Yom Kippur war. Sheikh Yamani had called

The two hold-outs upped the price only
5 percent.
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The two-tier pricing made no

economic sense and at Stockholm in July

countries with diverse economic and poli

OPEC unified the price at a 10 percent

tical

increase for this year.

only things they really agree on are that

In December

another price hike is probable.

More

systems and policy goals.

the price of

The

crude oil should be high

nationalizations have occurred and Gulf

and that they should control it.

countries have increased to 60 percent

5.3

PRODUCTION CONTROLS

their participation in oil companies.
OPEC has no production controls.
5.
5.1

HOW OPEC FUNCTIONS

students of cartels argue that production

OPEC AS A CARTEL

OPEC is called a cartel.
a peculiar one.

controls are necessary.
If not, increased
production will force prices down and

If it is, it is

break the cartel.

OPEC’s market system

Railroad Commission but he never con

product prices and availability only in

vinced other members.

OPEC does not have a monopoly;

quotas and many OPEC meetings have dis

OPEC in fact is a nonbinding

cussed a control method, but without

and unenforceable agreement among nations

agreement.

with respect to price and other oil poli
cies, but not production.

In Stockholm this year OPEC

members wrestled with production control

OPEC is hardly

again but did nothing.

secret; newspapers everywhere chronicle
its every move.

From time to time

Venezuela and others have plumped for

about 80 percent of exports is under its
control.

Dr. Perez Alfonzo en

visaged OPEC as an international Texas

operates only for crude oil and influences
directly.

Most

5.4

In a sense, OPEC is

only part of a cartel, handling upstream

VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT

Individual

operations, while the private cartel,

countries do control their own

truncated and weakened, but still highly

production. And OPEC relies on voluntary
restraint by its members. Saudi Arabia

profitable, operates downstream.

produces now at about two-thirds of its

5.2

capacity.

OPEC ORGANIZATION

also

Bear in mind that OPEC itself is a shell,

No OPEC

This leads to the common observation that

OPEC does not negotiate, lay down edicts,

oil is plentiful.

OPEC's Board of Gover

True and not true.

It

would be true if all that oil were on the

nors and secretariat are a small staff of

market.

specialists who spend their time prepar

But it isn't.

And it isn't be

cause the companies will not buy it at the

ing studies for the next meeting of OPEC
oil ministers.
The real guts of OPEC

price established by OPEC.

At the option

of the exporter, the oil stays in the

are the semi-annual meetings, during

ground, where it becomes more valuable

which member countries pass unanimous
resolutions that become the basis of oil
policy for individual countries.

expand by one-half.

country operates at its full potential.

not a full-bodied executive authority.
or make policy.

Venezuela's production could

each year, so long as OPEC controls and
keeps increasing the price.

But

5.5

PRICE SETTING

members guard jealously their decision
making authority and they are the ones

OPEC sets the price and lets the market

that execute policy and set the price,

determine how much it will take.

not OPEC.

tries market some of their oil independ

OPEC is no monolith.

It con

sists of a baker's dozen independent

Coun

ently, but mainly the companies that for
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merly owned the oil now buy what they

Venezuela— have an average per capita oil

think they can sell in product form after

income of $2,000 or more.

adding costs of transportation, storage,

enthusiasm for expanding production.

refining, and distribution, as well as
their profits.

5.8

They display no

POTENTIAL SPLIT

They do make mistakes and

some upstream as well as downstream com
petition exists.

So market prices vary.

But before expecting that this split
threatens OPEC, consider the effect of

But so long as OPEC holds its price and

expanded production and price reductions

downstream costs and profits stay the

on each group.

same, no price trend emerges.

excess oil capacity, about 3 million

Cartel or

The poor have limited

barrels a day, about 20 percent of their

not, it works.

present production.
5.6

CARTEL BREAK-UP

If Iran and Indonesia

expanded to full production, the market

The solution is stable so long as the 13

could absorb their new supplies without

countries accept the market's output

a price change if each other OPEC country

decision and the companies' buying de

cut back its production by only 8 percent.

cisions.

If the rich OPEC countries cut production

Should some country, say Iran,

decide that its income is insufficient,

by 20 percent, all of the poor OPEC

it can try to expand by moving closer to

countries could expand to full capacity

capacity.

without disturbing the price.

If it sells at the same price,

it increases its income.

If it shaves

5.9

COUNTRY AND COMPANY REACTION

the price— easy credit, hidden discounts,
barter deals— it may still increase in

But who will take the decision to substi

come.

tute Iranian and Indonesian oil for other

But another country, say Indonesia,

observes the same opportunity to raise its

OPEC oil?

revenue and does the same thing.

why should they?

The new

The companies mainly.

But

They might if Iran and

production burdens the market which re

Indonesia cut the price enough.

sponds with lower prices.

other OPEC countries could restrict pro

Competition re-

emerges, the cartel disintegrates, and
price falls.

Most economists believe

But the

duction enough to keep the price up.

So

Iran and Indonesia would increase their

that this is the inevitable scenario for

revenues at the expense of Saudi Arabian

OPEC.

and Kuwaiti revenues with the companies
acting as intermediary.

5.7

OPEC'S RICH AND POOR

But the companies

have ties with individual countries and

They fortify their argument by pointing

would not want to jeopardize their pre

to the deep division within OPEC between

ferred positions as crude buyers by shift

the rich and poor countries.

ing from certain to uncertain supplies.

The poor

OPEC countries— Algeria, Ecuador, Indo

The company that stops buying Saudi oil

nesia, Iran, Iraq, and Nigeria— have

to buy Iranian oil may forfeit its Saudi

large populations.

crude.

Their per capita oil

And one can imagine the incred

incomes average no more than $150 a year.

ible pressure by other members on Iran

Some are anxious to expand production, at

and Indonesia in OPEC's closed meetings.

the present price, of course.

The rich

5.10

STABILITY OF OPEC

OPEC nations— Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and

Minor cheating and chiseling on OPEC, yes,
but enough to break the arrangement, no.
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Every country has too much at stake to

5.13

try to increase its revenues at the ex

OPEC members have political goals that

pense of the revenues of other countries.

require the success of the present arrange

And every company has too much at stake

ment.

to imperil its crude supplies for momen
tary advantage.

In any fight the poor

those of all less-developed countries.
They want to force changes in the system
so that they benefit more.

who have more oil as well as financial

In addition,

the Arabs want a settlement with Israel.
Saudi Arabia is moving into the leader

And indeed, increasingly, even

the oil-importing countries have a stake

ship of the Arab states.

in the stability of the oil market at
present prices.
5.11

All feel that the international

economy works against their interests and

countries, who depend critically on the
high price, would lose more than the rich,
reserves.

OPEC POLITICAL GOALS

Iran wants to

restore its lost grandeur. Venezuela
aspires to leadership in Latin America.

PROFIT MAXIMIZING

The traditional demise of cartels depends

All dream dreams and none will sacrifice
its dreams for paltry pennies per barrel.

on the economist's profit maximizing

5.14

assumption. It may well be that private
enterprises in their greed inevitably

Since Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria,

destroy an artful cartel. But it does
not necessarily follow that sovereign

cisions, the organization necessarily

and the others make the real OPEC de
functions both as an economic and a

nations, with many goals and constraints,

political entity.

political and economic, are unthinking

In deciding to raise

the price of crude, for example, Saudi

short-term profit maximizers.
5.12

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Arabia must consider not only its revenues

OPEC DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

monetary reserves, oil reserves, oil

OPEC members need the petroleum income to

facilities, and relations with the com

develop their economies.

panies, but also its relations with other

All have under

developed economies, but with limits on

OPEC members and the integrity of OPEC

the amount of capital they can absorb.

cooperation.

For most, income since 197 3 has been in

effect on oil-importing countries whom

excess of what their economies can use.
The overflow has found its way into inter

Saudi Arabia wishes to influence with

national capital markets and foreign in

with whom it is allied, and on poor
countries with whom it identifies.

vestment. Foreign reserves of OPEC
countries jumped from $11 billion to over

TWO-TIER PRICING

The recent split in crude pricing illus
trates the political and economic nature

ing countries will pay $300 billion for
OPEC oil by 1985.

its foreign policy, on Arab countries

5.15

$63 billion in 1976 and are still climb
ing. Walter Levy estimates that import

It must also weigh the

of decision-making by OPEC members.

Even though some OPEC

At

countries have borrowed and would like

the beginning of 1977 the majority of
OPEC announced a 15 percent crude price

more money, they still have many golden
eggs, the promise of more if they stick

increase.

Saudi Arabia, however, had an

overriding interest in pressuring the

together, and would unlikely kill the

U. S. to seek a solution in the Middle

goose that lays the eggs.

East urgently.
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It raised the price 5

percent. In July in Stockholm those pre
ferring 15 percent backed down to 10 per

on the metamorphosis of OPEC into a

cent for the year and Saudi Arabia came
up to 10 percent. No economic analysis

They saw their economic growth going

cartel with undisguised dismay and fear.
down the drain, their lifestyle dissipat
ing, and economic power slipping through

could have predicted that configuration
of price changes.
6.

6.1

their fingers.

Decisions made by blacks

and browns from such ridiculous capitals

RESPONSES TO OPEC

as Riyadh, Doha, Libreville, Lagos, and
Quito were influencing their prices, pro
duction, incomes, and payments balances.

OPEC RECOGNITION

The oil companies and the world ignored
OPEC at first. Later the companies

To countries accustomed to making deci

Oil experts in the late 1960s remarked on

sions that influence others, it was a
shocking affront.

how ineffective OPEC was and predicted

6.4

negotiated with OPEC but gave up little.

continued low prices. When the companies
took OPEC seriously in 1970 to 1973, gov

The initial response was to fight back.
After some silly saber rattling that

ernments of oil-importing countries did
not support them.

EARLY POLICIES

served to unite OPEC even more and some

Only when OPEC had

financial hand-wringing over possible

won all the chips on the table did the

world monetary collapse, consuming

world recognize OPEC. This lends support
to the view that the only way to get the

countries first thought they would reduce
consumption, pressuring OPEC into bowing

man's attention is to knock him down and

to its betters.

kick him.

But this was painful and

was quickly abandoned.
6.2

OIL COMPANIES

Then followed a

The oil companies will certainly not

period in which they decided to wish
OPEC into failure, since all cartels fail.

charge the OPEC fortress now.

Revealing investigations and congressional

They had

their chance to retain control of oil and

hearings showed the gravity of the debacle

muffed it.

and the responsibility of industrial

Now, like parasitic birds,

countries.

they are content to perch astride their

Ideas on restricting the oil

hosts, picking away at the insects and

industry, countervailing power and eco

getting fat.

nomic warfare, novel ways to conserve oil,

They still have their down

able because of the higher crude price.

imaginative substitutes, and the use of
diplomacy and propaganda all enjoyed a

The Seven Sisters wince when moralists

season and still float in the air.

accuse them of bedding down with sheikhs
and bedoins. But they know how to sur

6.5

vive. John Blair is right; the oil
industry is now a symbiotic bilateral

Consuming countries turned to substitutes.
Nuclear energy seemed promising for many

oligopoly.

uses but for its environmental and safety

stream operations, now vastly more profit

I would add, with political

hazards.

as well as economic goals and constraints
that help to assure its stability.
6.3

SUBSTITUTES

Thermal heat from the earth,

collecting rays from the sun, and har
nessing the wind and water headlined

ATTITUDE OF OIL IMPORTERS

hundreds of articles. Coal has made a
comeback. All had two features in common:

Oil-importing countries at first looked

610

they were costly and development took a
long time.

7.

Consuming countries soon dis

7.1

IMPACT ON LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
COSTS AND DEBT

covered that any successful substitute
The burden imposed on non-OPEC developing

required protection, a guarantee that the
price of oil would not fall and jeopar
dize the new energy source, oil importers
now became advocates of the higher oil
price.

countries far exceeds difficulties en
countered in the last four years by indusstrial countries. The widely ignored 55mile-an-hour speed limit is small potatoes
compared to having no fuel to run the

6.6

OPEC'S SIGNAL

OPEC in creating an artificial shortage

machines to harvest the crop that keeps
people alive. Even with stringent cut

has also convinced the world of the grow

backs in imports, payments deficits attrib

ing real scarcity of petroleum.

utable to the high oil price strikes at

exists in a fixed amount.

Oil

How much long

er it will last, nobody knows.

the economic and political stability of a

Known re

hundred poor countries.

serves used at prevailing consumption
rates will last a bit into the next cen
tury.

The debt of less-

developed countries today is staggering.
7.2

SUPPORT FOR OPEC

More reserves will be found and

technological advances will improve the

All the rules of logic say that the oil-

recovery rate.

poor developing countries should have
formed a solid phalanx with the industrial

But the present flood

will become a river, the river a stream,

countries to

the stream a trickle. And the price of
oil will advance until oil's use for

assault the OPEC citadel.

They didn't. Through their pain, they
applauded OPEC and hailed the OPEC victory
as an achievement for the downtrodden

heat, power, and locomotion becomes un
thinkable. High-cost substitutes, but by

everywhere. The OPEC Robin Hood steals
from poor and rich alike. And to the

that time not so high cost as oil, will
do petroleum's chores.

poor, the sacrifice is worth it if Robin
6.7

OPEC BENEFITS

Hood succeeds in making off with goodies

What OPEC is doing is to provide a breath
ing space of a few decades during which
the world can develop substitutes and

from the rich man’s heretofore impene
trable caravan.
7.3

OPEC ASSISTANCE

adjust its life conditions to the absence
of oil.

OPEC endeavors to ameliorate some of the

By holding a price umbrella over

tion, stretches and develops new sup

crushing consequences of the high price
for less-developed countries. Saudi

plies, and buys time while encouraging

Arabia spreads its largess around the

the gradual development of substitutes.

Middle East, in Yemen, Egypt, and Syria.

Eventually, of course, even OPEC oil, and

Venezuela lends to Central America, Peru,
and Argentina. Many OPEC members lend
to the International Bank and the Inter
national Monetary Fund where oil-poor

oil, OPEC discourages wasteful consump

OPEC itself along with it, will

dis-

appear. In the interim OPEC will serve
the interests of consuming countries by
permitting an orderly and expeditious

countries may seek aid. OPEC itself has
a fund and makes loans to many countries.

adjustment.

The foreign aid programs of OPEC members
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on a per capita income basis are many

change in the way the world economy oper

times those of the U. S. and Europe.

ates.

7.4

less-developed countries are immense.

LEADER AND MODEL

And the poor countries must thank OPEC if
they pull it off.

But even more, OPEC identifies with the
less-developed countries.
effect:

It says in
8.

"We've discovered a way to get

a bigger slice of the pie and despite

8.1

your momentary suffering OPEC will lead
order in which all poor countries share
more bountifully."

CONCLUSIONS

SHIFT IN POWER BALANCE.

Because of OPEC the world is witnessing
one of those great sea changes in which

you into a new international economic

economic and political power seeks a new

And now OPEC is pro

equilibrium.

ceeding to do just that.
7.5

The potential long-run benefits to

This time it is not the

surge of a new nation, such as Spain,

NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

England, the United States, or Russia.
Rather it is a raw material and its

When the industrialized consuming coun
tries called a conference in Paris to

scattered but cooperating owners that

talk about energy, OPEC members refused

unsettle the power balance.

to talk only about oil. The conference,
they said, must cover all aspects of

beneficiaries will not be a nation, but
rather the world's poor countries.
It

development. The conference broke down.
But OPEC and other less-developed coun

may take a long time, and frustration

tries presented a solid front.
suming countries backed down.

and conflict may mar the process.
it's coming.

The con
The Paris

8.2

North-South dialogue began and made prog
ress in convincing the industrial

his Beirut home must smile as they muse
over the past and present.

Manuel Perez Guerrero of OPEC's Venezuela.

a new one.

where the voice of the poor is loud and

A new world in which the

prospects for the rich are not as bright
and for the poor not as dim.

insistent.
SPIRIT OF LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

From all the less-developed countries a
They believe that

the world is wrong and OPEC is right and
expect OPEC to champion their drive to a
better deal. And OPEC is not letting
them down.

Their brain

child is shattering a world and building

The forum now shifts to the United Nations

new spirit emanates.

A NEW WORLD

home outside Caracas and Sheikh Tariki in

The

chairman for the poor countries was Dr.

7.6

But

Dr. Perez Alfonzo on the veranda of his

coun

tries that a new order is mandatory.

And the

Although the North-South

talks, statements by leaders of OPEC and
other less-developed countries, and
United Nations resolutions may claim
small attention from the American press,
the world is rushing to a messy confron
tation in which everyone loses or to a
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